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Earnings announcementThis study examines the eﬀects of China’s 2008 trading ban regulation on the
insider trading of large shareholders in China’s A-share market. It ﬁnds no
evidence of insider trading during the ban period (one month before the
announcement of a ﬁnancial report), due to high regulation risk. However,
the ban only constrains the proﬁtability of insider trades during the ban per-
iod, while trades outside it remain highly proﬁtable. Informed insider trading
before the ban period is 2.83 times more proﬁtable than uninformed trading.
The regulation has changed insider trading patterns, but has been ineﬀective
in preventing insider trading by large shareholders due to rigid administrative
supervision and a lack of civil litigation and ﬂexible market monitoring. This
study enhances understanding of large shareholders’ trading behavior and
has important implications for regulators.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on
behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
When China’s A-share market was initially established, it comprised two types of stocks, tradable and
non-tradable. Stocks owned by large shareholders and executives were mostly non-tradable and could not
be traded in the secondary market. This issue of market segmentation between tradable and non-tradableesearch.
nomics
holder’s
ucation
ovincial
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secondary market resulting from this change, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) estab-
lished a lockup period of one to three years so that the non-tradable stocks could not be sold immediately.
Since the beginning of 2007, the locked-up stocks have gradually become tradable. By the end of 2011, almost
all of the non-tradable shares had become tradable, with insider trades happening more frequently. According
to the Wind Database, during the 2007–2012 period, there were 24,152 executive transactions and 10,059 large
shareholder transactions. Insider trades began to profoundly aﬀect the stock market’s development. However,
due to the lack of a sound transaction monitoring system and mechanisms to protect investors’ interests, insi-
der trading became prominent in the A-share market. The current ﬁght against insider trading is facing serious
challenges. How to improve the eﬀectiveness of insider trading regulation under the new circumstances is not
only an important academic research issue, but also a regulatory challenge.
Earnings announcements are listed companies’ most important periodic announcement. Information asym-
metry between insiders and outsiders is ampliﬁed around the earnings announcement period, as it provides
stronger incentives for insiders to use earnings information to trade. To keep insiders from trading on earnings
information, most countries have implemented a mandatory regulation prohibiting insiders from trading dur-
ing a short period before earnings announcements—often referred to as the trading ban regulation. In the
United Kingdom, as early as 1977, regulators began prohibiting insider trading two months before an earnings
announcement. In the United States, while there is no mandatory insider trading ban regulation, increased
litigation risk has prompted many large companies to voluntarily implement trading ban policies. The
Hong Kong Stock Exchange announced a new rule extending the board of directors’ trading ban period from
30 to 60 days before the year-end earnings announcement on February 12, 2009. More than 200 listed com-
panies jointly opposed the amendment and the event became the market’s worst ﬁght against the regulatory
body since the 2002 “penny stock incident.” However, as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange notes, other regu-
lations such as penalties for insider trading often take years of investigation and have little success. In com-
parison, the trading ban regulation has eliminated trading opportunities during a period within which insiders
are most likely to possess an information advantage. This regulation can eﬀectively minimize the occurrence of
insider trading, and thus has become a very useful tool for the regulators in restraining insider trading.
The CSRC enacted trading ban regulations on executives and large shareholders’ trades in April 2007 and
April 2008, respectively. The regulations prohibit executives from trading 10 days before earnings prean-
nouncements and 30 days before the formal ﬁnancial report is issued. In addition, large shareholders with
more than 30% of shares are prohibited from purchasing 10 days before earnings preannouncements and
10 days before the formal ﬁnancial report is issued. They are also prohibited from selling 30 days before
the semi-annual and annual ﬁnancial reports. Would insiders give up the chance to proﬁt on earnings infor-
mation under the trading ban regulation? Media reports on insider trading around the ban period are plen-
tiful. For example, the chairman of Bishengyuan signiﬁcantly reduced his holdings right before the trading
ban period of the 2012 annual report, as the company was expected to have losses in 2012 and 2013, causing
the stock price to drop 35% within 3 days. Faced with the trading ban regulation, insiders may adjust how they
trade and conceal informative trading activities. What is the new insider trading pattern under the ban regu-
lation? The game between insiders and regulators creates uncertainty regarding the regulation’s eﬀectiveness,
but can a trading ban regulation eﬀectively reduce insider trading proﬁtability?Table 1
Trading ban regulations.
Type of insider Market Earnings
preannouncements
Annual and semi-annual
ﬁnancial reports
Quarterly ﬁnancial
reports
Directors, Supervisors, Managers
(Executives)
Main board and
SME board
Cannot buy or sell
10 days before
Cannot buy or sell 30 days
before
Cannot buy or sell
30 days before
Largest shareholder P30% and
ultimate controlling owner
Main board Cannot buy 10 days
before
Cannot buy 10 days before;
cannot sell 30 days before
Cannot buy 10 days
before
Largest shareholder P30% and
ultimate controlling owner
SME board Cannot buy or sell
10 days before
Cannot buy or sell 15 days
before
Cannot buy or sell
15 days before
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examine the new insider trading patterns generated by the trading ban regulation. We also evaluate the reg-
ulation’s eﬀectiveness from an insider trading proﬁtability perspective. Trading behavior is systematically dif-
ferent between executives and large shareholders, and the corresponding ban policies also diﬀer. The largest
shareholder is at the core of corporate governance, as the size of their transactions and market inﬂuence far
exceed that of the executive transactions. Thus, we focus on largest shareholder transactions in this paper.
We ﬁnd that during the trading ban period (one month before the announcement of a ﬁnancial report),
large shareholder trading is not evident due to high regulation risk. However, private companies’ large share-
holders choose to trade before the ban period while those of state-owned companies choose to trade after the
ban period to exploit private earnings information. Private companies’ large shareholders prefer to trade on
annual or semi-annual reports, whereas those of state-owned companies prefer to trade on quarterly reports
associated with lower regulation risk. Private and state-owned companies operate from diﬀerent corporate
governance backgrounds, and the diﬀerent trading behavior identiﬁed above corresponds to the diﬀerences
in information advantages, proﬁt-seeking incentives and risk preferences of private and state-owned share-
holders. From the perspective of regulation eﬀectiveness, the trading ban regulation can constrain the prof-
itability of insider trading within the ban period, but high proﬁtability still exists for insider transactions
immediately outside the ban period. In particular, insider informative trades before the ban period can achieve
proﬁts that are 2.83 times those of uninformed trades. The abnormal returns obtained by large shareholders of
private companies and those with less than 30% ownership are particularly prominent.
In summary, the trading ban regulation can only constrain insider trading to a certain extent. Large share-
holders can adjust trading by following the regulation in appearance but executing informative trading around
the ban period. The regulation has changed insider trading patterns, but it has not eﬀectively prevented large
shareholders from engaging in insider trading. The compromised eﬀectiveness of the regulation is partially due
to the fact that the regulatory tools used to prevent insider trading are very limited. Currently, there is a lack of
civil litigation and other ﬂexible market monitoring tools to deal with insider trading, and the monitoring
function relies solely on the rigid administrative supervision of the CSRC, the loopholes which can be used
by insiders to outwardly conform to the regulations while actually proﬁting from insider trading. To improve
the eﬀectiveness of insider trading regulations, administrative supervision must be integrated with a ﬂexible
market monitoring system. A civil litigation system also needs to be established against insider trading, and
media monitoring should be used.
This paper has important theoretical contributions. First, the literature on insider trading focuses mainly
on mature markets, and there is a considerable lack of research on emerging markets. The stock markets
in China are emerging and in transition toward a market economy. Thus, regulatory enforcement and investor
protection are relatively weak and corporate governance and market eﬃciency are merely adequate. Insider
trading is facing fewer regulatory and market constraints, so trading behavior and the eﬀectiveness of regula-
tory policies in China are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those in mature markets. This paper complements the
literature by providing new evidence on insider trading and the regulation’s eﬀectiveness in emerging markets.
The ﬁndings clarify how diﬀerent institutional backgrounds and regulatory environments aﬀect insider trading
behavior. Second, the insider trading literature focuses mostly on executives, not large shareholders, mainly
due to the fact that in Western markets, ownership is more dispersed and large shareholders do not have much
of an information advantage. However, in China’s A-share market, ownership is highly concentrated and the
largest shareholders usually play a central role in corporate governance, obtaining important insider informa-
tion by controlling the board of directors and management. Focusing on largest shareholder transactions, this
study extends the literature by investigating how ownership attributes aﬀect large shareholders’ trading behav-
ior. We ﬁnd that large shareholders of private companies and state-owned entities trade diﬀerently under the
trading ban regulation, possibly due to diﬀerences in their information advantages, proﬁt-seeking incentives
and risk preferences. Third, this study contributes to the research on the relationship between regulation
and insider trading. The mandatory trading ban regulation is a key regulatory tool widely used around the
world, except in the United States; however, relevant research is limited and focuses mainly on its economic
consequences. Few have examined how this type of regulation aﬀects insider trading behavior. This paper sys-
tematically studies how a newly introduced trading ban regulation aﬀects large shareholders’ trading behavior
in China. We ﬁnd that corporate governance and regulation risk systematically aﬀect large shareholders’
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high or low ownership are all factors inﬂuencing large shareholders’ trading patterns.
2. Literature review
To prevent insider trading around earnings announcements, most stock markets outside the United States
use a mandatory trading ban regulation. However, in the United States, regulators do not set a mandatory
trading ban period. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 and the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002 (hereafter SOX) have signiﬁcantly increased regulatory penalties related to insider trading before earn-
ings announcements. To respond to soaring regulation and litigation risk, many large companies have volun-
tarily set up trading ban periods. Bettis et al. (2000) ﬁnd that 78% of their sample ﬁrms in the United States
voluntarily set trading ban periods before earnings announcements. The general practice is to allow insiders to
trade only 3 to 12 days after earnings announcements. How do signiﬁcant changes in regulatory environment
aﬀect insider trading? Are mandatory or voluntary trading ban policies eﬀective, and what are their economic
implications? These questions are proving to be interesting research issues.
First, increased regulation risk has changed the timing of insider trades around earnings announcements.
Trades before announcements have dropped signiﬁcantly, while those after announcements have soared.
Particularly, insider sales are postponed after negative earnings announcements because sales before bad news
are more likely to trigger litigation than those before good news (Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; Lustgarten
and Mande, 1995; Garﬁnkel, 1997).
Second, the regulations have eﬀectively constrained insider trading shortly before earnings announcements.
Previous research suggests that insider trading in the short window before earnings announcements has
become less evident (Elliot et al., 1984; Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Lustgarten and Mande, 1995; Sivakumar
and Waymire, 1994). Garﬁnkel (1997) ﬁnds that after the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act, earnings announcements have had higher information content, consistent with the decrease
in insider trading before earnings announcements after the act. According to Brochet (2010), as SOX short-
ened the disclosure period for insider transactions to two days while increasing legal penalties, the information
content of insider transaction disclosure announcements after the SOX era also increased. Meanwhile, insider
sales before negative earnings news and stock price drops have also decreased.
However, insiders have not completely given up the use of inside information. Instead, their trading has
become more sophisticated and subtle. Research using short-term windows ﬁnds that even though insider
trading has become less evident in the short period before earnings announcements, insiders still use the earn-
ings information to trade after announcements, and passive trading has become more prevalent (Elliot et al.,
1984; Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Lustgarten and Mande, 1995; Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994). Studies focus-
ing on long-term windows (Ke et al., 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005) ﬁnd that insiders continue to use
important future earnings information (such as an interruption of quarterly earnings’ continuous growth) to
trade, normally 3 to 9 quarters in advance. Huddart et al. (2007) ﬁnd that insider trading is associated with
regulation risk. In the United States, regulatory and judicial practices oppose insider trading before earnings
announcements without explicitly opposing insider trading before the oﬃcial ﬁling of ﬁnancial reports. Thus,
regulation risk is highest shortly before earnings announcements, but relatively low before the ﬁling of ﬁnan-
cial reports. They also ﬁnd that insiders do not use information in earnings announcements, but they do use
information in ﬁnancial reports to trade.
As an important regulatory policy, the eﬀectiveness of the trading ban regulation and its economic impli-
cations have gained the attention of academics and regulators. The regulation is thus expected to become a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the implementation of the ban period reduces insider trading prof-
itability, protects the interests of external investors and thereby increases market liquidity. On the other hand,
the implementation prohibits insider trading before earnings announcements, which is not conducive to con-
veying private inside information to the markets, thereby reducing the timely reﬂection of earnings informa-
tion in stock prices. Empirically, Bettis et al. (2000) ﬁnd that the United States’ company-level ban regulation
eﬀectively curbs trading activity before earnings announcements and reduces trading proﬁts within the ban
period while improving market liquidity. Hillier and Marshall (2002) ﬁnd that the United Kingdom’s
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the regulation’s eﬀect on reducing trading proﬁts is limited. Kabir and Vermaelen (1996) ﬁnd that the trading
ban regulation launched by the Netherlands in 1987 has failed to improve market liquidity, and the speed with
which stock prices reﬂect positive earnings information has also decreased.
In summary, the relevant insider trading literature focuses mostly on mature markets in the United States
and the United Kingdom, creating a lack of research on emerging markets. Research on these mature markets
ﬁnds that insider trading on earnings information is more subtle and complex due to increased regulations,
and that trading ban policies, whether at the voluntary or mandatory country level, signiﬁcantly aﬀect insider
trading behavior, trading proﬁtability, market liquidity and price eﬃciency. The eﬀects diﬀer by market, mak-
ing it necessary to examine the issues in speciﬁc markets and regulatory backgrounds.
Insider trading has become a relatively new research topic for the A-share market since 2007. Many
relevant studies focusing on the short-term abnormal returns of insider trades ﬁnd that large shareholders
and executive trading can obtain signiﬁcant short-term abnormal returns (Zeng, 2008; Zhu et al., 2011a;
Cai, 2011). Zhu et al. (2011b) ﬁnd that executive trading uses private information on stock mispricing and
future earnings changes, so that executive trading can gain long-term abnormal returns. Zhu et al. (2014)
ﬁnd that aggregate insider trading strongly predicts future market returns while corporate governance
aﬀects the predictability of aggregate insider trading. Zhang and Zeng (2011) ﬁnd that trading conducted
by insiders’ relatives is probably an alternative, subtle form of insider trading. Many studies also note that
insiders can manipulate information disclosure to beneﬁt their trading. Wu and Wu (2010) ﬁnd that com-
panies disclose good news before shareholders sell or postpone bad news after they sell. Wang and Lian
(2009) ﬁnd that the timing of large shareholders’ sales interacts with that of management forecasts. Some
research examines the eﬀectiveness of the regulatory policies. Zeng and Zhang (2009) ﬁnd that executive
short-swing trading can obtain abnormal returns. Zhu et al. (2013) ﬁnd that insiders can increase trading
proﬁts by delaying the disclosure of transaction information. In summary, the empirical evidence suggests
that insiders in the Chinese markets can obtain abnormal returns. Likewise, relevant regulatory enforce-
ment is loose, providing insiders with opportunities to obtain excess returns. The literature on Chinese
stock markets mainly focuses on insider trading proﬁtability, with little direct investigation of insider
trading on speciﬁc events and the eﬀectiveness of regulations. Research on the trading ban regulation is
basically nonexistent.3. Sample and descriptive statistics
The background of large shareholder trading in the A-share market, which is quite unique, is related to the
tradable share reform and the lockup arrangement. Before the reform, non-tradable shares could not be sold
in the secondary market, and the prices of non-tradable shares were signiﬁcantly below those of tradable
shares in the secondary market. The reform allowed non-tradable and tradable shareholders to negotiate
and agree on compensation packages that the non-tradable shareholders would pay to obtain the right to
trade. The compensation packages generally include paying cash dividends, granting bonus shares, insider
stock lockup provisions and other commitments. Regulators did not interfere with the design of such compen-
sation packages, but they did limit the minimum lockup period to one year for executives and large sharehold-
ers with more than 5% ownership. Most companies’ largest shareholders committed to a lockup period of
2–3 years. The compensation package selected by each company is diﬀerent, as is the time it takes to convert
all of the non-tradable shares. To alleviate the eﬀect of the lockup expiration on the secondary market, reg-
ulators required that insiders did not sell their stocks all at once after the lockup expired. Instead, executives
were allowed to sell up to 25% of their shares each year and large shareholders with more than 5% ownership
could not sell more than 5% of their total shares within 12 months and more than 10% of their total shares
within 24 months.
Companies gradually started to remove the lockup and insiders started to trade in 2007. On April 10, 2007,
the CSRC issued “Rules on Company Stocks Owned and Traded by Directors, Supervisors and Senior
Management,” which enacted the trading ban policy around earnings announcements. It was not until
Table 2
Time Diﬀerence between Earnings Disclosure Date and End of the Accounting Period.
Mean Median Std. p5 p95
Quarterly earnings 25.425 26 4.056 18 30
Semi-annual earnings 47.811 50 11.028 26 61
Annual earnings 89.597 90 22.986 45 119
All 45.281 30 27.997 20 110
174 C. Zhu, L. Wang /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 169–191April 20081 that the CSRC issued the “Advice on the Sale of Stocks after Removal of the Lock-up” and pro-
posed a trading ban policy for large shareholders of listed companies on the main board. It stipulates that
large shareholders with more than 30% ownership and ultimate controlling shareholders are prohibited from
selling 30 days before annual and semiannual ﬁnancial reports. In August 2008, the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges issued the “Guidance on Large Shareholders of Listed Companies Buying Stocks” (amended
on September 24, 2008). It speciﬁes that large shareholders with more than 30% ownership and ultimate con-
trolling shareholders cannot buy stocks 10 days before earnings preannouncements and 10 days before formal
ﬁnancial reports, as shown in Table 1. The trading ban policies for the small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) board are diﬀerent from those of the main board. Because there is a limited number of earnings pre-
announcements2 and the lengths of the trading bans between the SME and main boards diﬀer, here we only
focus on the trading of the largest shareholders of the main board companies around formal ﬁnancial reports
(including quarterly, semi-annual and annual). The main board’s trading ban on shareholders’ selling is
restricted to large shareholders with more than 30% ownership and speciﬁc types of ﬁnancial reports (annual
and semi-annual reports), so the policy can result in diﬀerent regulation risks for shareholders’ trading.
Accordingly, we examine whether the diﬀerences in regulation risks result in diﬀerent trading behavior.
Largest shareholders’ trading data are sourced from the Wind database. The trading data are from January
1, 2007 to September 30, 2011. This includes shareholder trading data through the continuous auction system
and the block trade platform. We exclude trading below RMB300,0003 and trading of B-share companies and
companies of the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), leaving us with 1,965 transactions. We examine trans-
actions around ﬁnancial reports and decide to focus on transactions within [60, 10] days of the disclosure
date for ﬁnancial reports, which further reduces the sample size. The [60, 10] window covers the trading
ban period, speciﬁcally, one month before and 10 days after.
According to the Chinese ﬁnancial reporting disclosure requirements, quarterly earnings must be disclosed
within one month after the quarter-end; semi-annual earnings within two months after the half-year-end; and
annual earnings within four months after the year-end. Based on the statistics shown in Table 2, the actual
disclosure dates are consistent with the disclosure requirements. Generally, the median and mean of the time
diﬀerence between the formal report disclosure date and the end of the accounting period are 30 and
45.28 days, respectively. The later the disclosure of earnings, the more accurate insiders’ private earnings
information.
We provide the statistics for transactions within the [60, 10] window of the disclosure date for ﬁnancial
reports in Table 3. We use the trading date of the largest shareholder minus the earnings disclosure date to
obtain the “time gap.” If we have several time gaps for the same transaction, because there are several earnings
disclosures for each company, we use the time gap with the smallest absolute value. The results based on this
method are shown as the “original results” in Table 3. A total of 48% of the transactions occurred in the [60,
10] window, but transactions with time gaps greater than 10 are not likely to be using information from the1 There are two key reasons why regulations regarding large shareholder trading were issued later. First, the lockup period for large
shareholders is usually longer than that for executives, so large shareholder trading was rare before 2008. Second, trading ban regulations
in most jurisdictions (especially those in Hong Kong, as they are more inﬂuential for policies in mainland China) primarily focus on
executive trading, so there is less to be learned about how to regulate large shareholder trading.
2 Mandatory earnings preannouncements are limited to three situations (loss, earnings change of 50% or above and change of loss to
proﬁt).
3 The information content of transactions with small amounts is low, so they are excluded. The threshold of RMB300,000 is 1 quantile of
the selling transactions amount and 5 quantiles of the buying transactions amount.
Table 3
Time gap between trading date of largest shareholders and earnings disclosure date.
Original result Adjusted result for trades (10, 90] Adjusted result for all trades
Window No. of trans. % Window No. of trans. Window No. of trans. %
[157, 120) 216 [181, 120) 216 0.11
[120, 90) 8 0.00 [120, 90) 271 [120, 90) 279 0.14
[90, 60) 91 0.05 [90, 60) 232 [90, 60) 323 0.16
[60, 30) 366 0.19 [60, 30) 187 [60, 30) 553 0.28
[30, 0] 331 0.17 [30, 0] 15 [30, 0] 346 0.18
(0, 10] 248 0.13 (0, 10] 248 0.13
(10, 30] 439 0.22
(30, 60] 368 0.19
(60, 90] 114 0.06
Total 1965 1.00 Total 921 Total 1965 1.00
C. Zhu, L. Wang /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 169–191 175previous earnings disclosure. Instead, they are probably using forthcoming earnings disclosures. Thus, we
make an adjustment to calculate the time gap between the trading date and the forthcoming earnings disclo-
sure for this type of transaction. The statistics based on this adjustment method are shown as the “adjusted
results.” Under the adjusted method, 58% of the transactions occur within the [60, 10] window and there are
1,147 transactions. We think that the [60, 10] window eﬀectively captures insider trading around earnings
disclosures.
To examine the eﬀect of the trading ban regulation, the [60, 10] window is further divided into three peri-
ods: within the ban period (PBAN, one month before earnings disclosure, also referred to as the window period
or the sensitive period), one month before the ban period (PBF) and 10 days after the ban period
4 (PAF).
Active Trading
-30
Active Trading
PBF PBAN
PAF
Passive Trading
-60 0 10
Announcement of 
Financial ReportThe ways in which insiders use earnings information can be divided into active and passive trading (Hillier
and Marshall, 2002; Huddart et al., 2007; Kolasinski and Li, 2010). Active trading is when insiders use earn-
ings information to trade before an earnings announcement (PBF, PBAN), e.g., selling (buying) before bad
(good) earnings news is announced. Passive trading is when insiders have knowledge of forthcoming earnings
information, but postpone trading until after the earnings announcement, e.g., buying (selling) after the bad
(good) earnings news is announced. Passive trading after an earnings announcement cannot be eﬀectively4 There are two reasons why we use 10 days instead of 30 days after the trading ban period for PAF. The ﬁrst is to avoid overlapping
transactions. Sometimes, the period between two earnings disclosures is very short, so one transaction can fall under multiple windows,
e.g. 30 days after the previous announcement [0, 30] and 60 days before the next earnings announcement [60, 0]. This results in
overlapping observations. To be more speciﬁc, if we use the [60, 30] window, this issue becomes very problematic as 192 transactions
(28%) are double counted, in the [0, 30] and [60, 0] windows. If we use the [60, 10] window, only 38 transactions are double counted, in
the [0, 10] and [60, 0] windows. Second, the eﬀect of the earnings announcement on the stock price is most evident 10 days after the
announcement. If insiders choose to passively trade on earnings announcement information, they are most likely to trade within the
10 days when there is more stock price reaction. Hillier and Marshall (2002) also use the 10 days after an earnings announcement [0, 10] to
study passive trading.
Table 4
Sample selection.
Sample selection process Number of transactions
[60, 10] Trading of largest shareholders 1147
Plus: (0, 10] trading that also falls into [60, 0] of the next earnings disclosure 38
Less: trading two days before and after earnings preannouncements 15
Less: trading of SME board companies 159
Remaining trading of main board companies 1011
Less: trading before the trading ban regulation is enacted 241
Remaining trading of main board companies after the trading ban regulation is enacted 770
176 C. Zhu, L. Wang /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 169–191separated from liquidity-driven transactions, so it is allowed by regulations and referred to as safety trading
(Kallunki and Peltoniemi, 2009). Active trading happens before an earnings announcement and is the focus of
insider trading regulation.
In the sample selection process, 38 transactions fall within the [0, 10] window of the previous ﬁnancial
report and within the [60, 0] window of the next ﬁnancial report. We keep these 38 transactions for both
windows, and doing so in our sensitivity tests does not change the results. We also exclude 15 transactions
around earnings preannouncements, as they are more likely to be related to earnings preannouncements
instead of ﬁnancial reports. Because the lengths of the trading ban periods diﬀer between the main and
SME boards, we exclude the 159 transactions from SME board companies. There are 1,011 remaining trans-
actions from main board companies, 770 of which happened after the trading ban policies were issued (April
20, 2008 to September 30, 2011) and 241 of which happened before the trading ban policies (January 1, 2007 to
April 19, 2008). In our analysis, we mainly use the largest shareholders’ transactions of main board companies
after April 20, 2008 (see Table 4).
Before the trading ban regulation, because most companies’ large shareholders’ shares were still locked,
such shareholders’ trading was less frequent and there were only 241 transactions in the [60, 10] window,
as shown in Table 5. However, after the trading ban regulation, the transactions increased to 770, with selling
transactions accounting for about 70% and buying transactions accounting for only 30% of all transactions. It
is possible that after the long lockup period, insiders were very motivated to cash in their shares. The mean
trading amounts per transaction for buying and selling are RMB62,443,280 and RMB61,684,930, respectively,
which have signiﬁcant wealth eﬀects. The median percentages of ownership traded between buying and selling
are 0.001 and 0.010, respectively, so the ownership bought is much smaller than that sold.
In Table 6, we ﬁnd that trading in the [30, 0] window decreased from 42% of the transactions before the
regulation to 28% of the transactions after the regulation, with the decrease mainly due to selling. In contrast,
trading in the [60, 30] window increased from 41% before to 51% after the regulation. An important
change caused by the regulation is that it moves trading to before the ban period. The ban regulation only
prohibits the trading of large shareholders with more than 30% ownership and trading around annual and
semi-annual reports. Thus, there are legitimate transactions even during the ban period, PBAN. This is whyTable 5
Descriptive statistics for largest shareholder trading before and after the trading ban regulation in the [60, 10] window.
Percentage of ownership traded Shares traded (in 10,000) RMB amount traded (in 10,000)
N Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std.
Pre-regulation
Buy 11 0.020 0.013 0.020 2045.308 323.147 4907.351 17545.467 2480.280 47097.432
Sell 230 0.014 0.012 0.011 527.063 380.013 486.376 7222.429 4408.156 8292.952
Post-regulation
Buy 223 0.004 0.001 0.006 753.047 138.000 2775.782 5686.873 1135.417 20799.101
Sell 547 0.013 0.010 0.012 531.782 315.740 623.555 5725.339 3034.803 7175.080
All
Buy 234 0.004 0.001 0.008 813.795 141.352 2906.873 6244.328 1159.711 22665.096
Sell 777 0.013 0.010 0.011 530.385 339.000 585.997 6168.493 3512.287 7548.894
Table 6
Distribution of largest shareholders’ trading windows before and after the trading ban regulation.
PBF [60, 30) PBAN [30, 0] PAF (0, 10] All
No. of transactions % No. of transactions % No. of transactions % No. of transactions %
Before the trading ban regulation (2007.1.1–2008.4.19)
Buy 4 0.36 4 0.36 3 0.27 11 1
Sell 94 0.41 97 0.42 39 0.17 230 1
Total 98 0.41 101 0.42 42 0.17 241 1
After the trading ban regulation (2008.4.20–2011.9.30)
Buy 96 0.43 90 0.40 37 0.17 223 1
Sell 293 0.54 123 0.22 131 0.24 547 1
Total 389 0.51 213 0.28 168 0.22 770 1
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14%) actually violating the regulation.
In China, the ownership types of listed companies are diverse, and include private- and state-owned.
State-owned listed companies can be controlled by diverse types of ultimate owners, such as the central
SASAC, local state-owned parent companies, local state-owned conglomerates, the local SASAC and public
universities. As Table 7 shows, the trading of large shareholders in private companies is most active and
accounts for 41.7% of all transactions. The trading of local state-owned parent companies accounts for
31.4% of all transactions.4. Empirical tests I: The eﬀect of trading ban regulation on insider trading patterns
4.1. Hypothesis development
Under the trading ban regulation, insiders can move trades to before (active) or after (passive) the trading
ban period to avoid the ban period. Studies of United States’ markets ﬁnd that passive trading is the main
coping strategy, consistent with the increased regulation and litigation risk related to active trading (Elliot
et al., 1984; Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Lustgarten and Mande, 1995; Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; Ke
et al., 2003). However, in China’s A-share market with its diﬀerent regulatory environment, it is possible that
insider trading patterns under the ban regulation are diﬀerent.
The severe regulatory penalties, ﬂexible civil legal system and eﬃcient judicial system in the United States
provide an eﬀective regulatory environment to combat insider trading. The American legal system has
imposed severe penalties against insider trading. The Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984 stipulates that insi-
der traders will receive criminal ﬁnes whether they have proﬁted from the transactions or not. The Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Sanctions Act of 1988 increased the individual criminal imprisonment term from
5 to 10 years and the individual maximum ﬁnes from $100,000 to $1 million. It also increased ﬁnes against an
organization from $500,000 to $2.5 million and created a bounty system to encourage community oversight
with the informant reporting insider trading receiving 10% of the penalty. Meanwhile, executives are respon-
sible for subordinates’ insider trading (Garﬁnkel, 1997). The 2002 SOX expands the penalties even further,
increasing individual ﬁnes to $5 million at the upper limit and organizational ﬁnes to $25 million at the upper
limit. Likewise, individual criminal imprisonment terms can be as long as 20 years. The United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has extensive power to enforce regulations against insider
trading. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Sanctions Act of 1988 gives the SEC the power to impose
civil penalties and prohibit executives involved in insider trading from serving in public companies (Shen,
2009). In civil litigation procedures, defendants usually have the burden of proof, which signiﬁcantly increases
the success rate of lawsuits against insider trading. Class action motivates lawyers and investors to launch legal
actions against insider trading (Gao and Wang, 2000). Regarding insider trading before earnings announce-
ments, the United States regulators do not impose mandatory and uniform trading ban periods; instead, they
reserve substance-over-form discretion and rely on ﬂexible civil litigation systems and stringent regulatory
Table 7
Ownership type of largest shareholder trading after the regulation.
Ownership type Private-
owned
State-owned entities (controlled by) All
Central
SASAC
Local state-owned
parent company
Local state-owned
conglomerate
Local
SASAC
Public
university
Number of
transactions
321 121 242 53 29 4 770
% 41.7% 15.7% 31.4% 6.9% 3.8% 0.5% 100%
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ments and if there is an abnormal coincidence between the trading activity and the earnings information, the
market and the regulators can still question whether there is insider trading. Regulatory scrutiny, litigation
and the right to seek economic recovery are powerful weapons to prevent and detect insider trading activities.
Under close regulatory and market monitoring, insider trading before earnings announcements faces high reg-
ulation and litigation risk. Studies note that insider trading before earnings announcements has become less
evident, with more insiders choosing to trade after earnings announcements (Elliot et al., 1984; Givoly and
Palmon, 1985; Lustgarten and Mande, 1995; Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; Ke et al., 2003).
In China, the overall regulatory environment is less stringent, the securities-related civil judicial system is
lacking and judicial enforcement is ineﬃcient (Huang, 2005, 2012; Shen, 2009). These factors may have weak-
ened the eﬀectiveness of regulatory policies such as the trading ban regulation. There are no separate laws on
insider trading, but there are stipulations against it in the Securities Act (eﬀective in 1999 and amended in
2004, 2005 and 2013), the Criminal Law (eﬀective in 1979 and amended in 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2005,
2009 and 2011) and the Corporation Law (eﬀective in 1994 and amended in 1999, 2004, 2005 and 2013).
The Securities Act (2006) stipulates that illegal income from insider trading is conﬁscated in addition to pos-
sible administrative penalties up to ﬁve times the illegal income. For cases with illegal income less than
RMB30,000, there is an administrative penalty between RMB30,000 and RMB600,000. For companies
engaged in insider trading, the executives directly responsible for the incidents are given a warning and a pen-
alty of RMB30,000 to RMB300,000. Cases involving serious violations of insider trading5 are transferred to
the judicial system to face criminal prosecution. The Criminal Law (1997) provides that serious cases involving
insider trading or the leakage of inside information result in imprisonment or criminal detention of up to ﬁve
years and a criminal ﬁne of up to ﬁve times the illegal income. For very serious cases, the imprisonment term is
between 5 and 10 years. The legal penalties for the Securities Act and the Criminal Law are relatively light and
essentially principle-based. There are no corresponding operational judicial procedures to support, so it is dif-
ﬁcult to enforce the laws (Huang, 2012). For example, the Securities Act (2006) suggests that insider trading
leads to economic loss for investors, who may request a civil claim, but it does not provide details on how
relevant civil lawsuits should be processed and, thus far, the court does not accept civil lawsuits for insider
trading. In China, the legal system against insider trading depends on the CSRC’s administrative and criminal
sanctions, as civil litigation is lacking. However, the CSRC has limited enforcement power, ﬁnancial resources
and staﬀ. It also lacks independence, so its eﬀectiveness in enforcing insider trading is limited (Huang, 2012;
Shen, 2009). In contrast, the court lacks experience related to securities litigation and the operational judicial
interpretation of the laws, such that only a limited number of insider trading cases have been processed, and
the processing cycle is long (Huang, 2012). From the perspective of regulatory and judicial practices, the
CSRC only enforced penalties in 12 insider trading cases from 1990 to 2006 (Shen, 2009). From 2008 to
2011, it investigated 153 insider trading cases and imposed administrative penalties in only 31 cases, moving
39 cases to the judiciary system. From 2007 to 2011, the courts around the country ﬁnished only 22 cases
related to insider trading and the administrative penalties and criminal ﬁnes in these cases were too light to
have any deterrent eﬀects (China Securities Journal, May 23, 2012).
On November 16, 2010, the State Council released the Advice on the Sanction and Prevention of Insider
Trading in Capital Markets (hereinafter, “Advice”) to the CSRC, the Ministry of Public Security, the5 When the amount of insider trading is above RMB500,000, insider trading proﬁt is above RMB150,000 or there has been frequent
insider trading.
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together to prevent insider trading activities. The Advice notes that “the current ﬁght against insider trading in
capital markets is facing serious challenges.” Since the Advice was released, diﬀerent ministries have increased
their joint sanction eﬀorts. On March 29, 2012, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate issued the
Interpretations on the Application of Laws Related to Criminal Cases of Insider Trading and Leakage of
Inside Information. This is the ﬁrst legal interpretation regarding insider trading, and it provides systematic
judicial interpretation of individuals with inside information and individuals who obtain inside information
illegally, the sensitive period of inside information and the standards of insider trading conviction and penal-
ties. Unfortunately, it does not mention civil action, which is still a serious deﬁciency in the legal system for
insider trading.
At present, China’s ﬁght against insider trading depends on relatively rigid administrative regulations with-
out eﬀective civil litigation and market monitoring, and legal enforcement is weak (Huang, 2012; Shen, 2009).
Current administrative regulations with rigid ban periods have limitations, as long as the transactions fall out-
side the ban period. Even when earnings information is used, insiders can easily bypass the regulatory penal-
ties and thus do not have to worry about civil lawsuits. We predict that to avoid regulation risk, insiders will
not trade within the trading ban periods PBAN, but will actively trade around the trading ban period, PBF.
Hypothesis 1. Active insider trading is not evident during the trading ban period, PBAN, due to regulation risk.
Hypothesis 2. Active insider trading is evident around the trading ban period, PBF, due to the lack of civil
action against and market monitoring of insider trading.
Large shareholders in private and state-owned companies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in terms of their ability
to obtain inside information, proﬁt-seeking incentives and risk preferences. These diﬀerences could result in
diﬀerent trading behavior (Zhu et al., 2014).
From an information advantage perspective, large shareholders in private companies are often more
involved in business operations and have much tighter control over the listed companies’ operating decisions
and the selection of the executives. This gives them a more substantial information advantage than large share-
holders in state-owned entities, among them the largest shareholders of local state-owned parent companies
have relatively more control over the operating decisions of the listed companies. The large shareholders of
other state-owned entities may be overloaded by monitoring too many companies or still be bothered by
administrative orientation, and thus have weaker control over the listed companies and less of an information
advantage.
Diﬀerences in information advantages can aﬀect insiders’ choice of active or passive trading. Active trading
in PBF requires large shareholders to obtain earnings information in advance, so shareholders need to have a
stronger information advantage. The large shareholders of private companies may be more capable of engag-
ing in active trading because they seem to have a more signiﬁcant information advantage.
In addition to information advantages, trading incentives and risk preferences are important reasons for
diﬀerent trading behavior. The large shareholders of private companies can enjoy the entire trading proﬁt,
and thus they pay more attention to active trading for proﬁt and are more willing to take risks for high
returns. In contrast, the proﬁts of state-owned large shareholders, including stock trading proﬁts, ultimately
belong to the state. Hence, their incentive to trade is weak as they cannot retain the proﬁts. In addition, the
chairmen or the CEO of the large shareholders who made the stock trading decisions is often government oﬃ-
cial (Fan et al., 2007) who are more concerned about their bureaucratic career in the government, more risk
averse and less willing to be exposed to the regulation risk generated by insider trading. Zhu et al. (2014) note
aggregate insider trading’s ability to predict future market returns and ﬁnd that the predictive power of insider
trading by the largest shareholders in state-owned companies is signiﬁcantly weaker than that of the largest
shareholders in private companies.
Hypothesis 3. From information advantage, proﬁt-seeking incentive and risk preference perspectives, the
largest shareholders of private companies are more capable of and motivated to engage in active trading than
the largest shareholders of state-owned companies.
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We use Huddart et al. (2007) model to examine whether insider trades use earnings information by inves-
tigating the relationship between net trading size and earnings news after the enactment of the trading ban
regulation.Table
Variab
Variab
TradeB
TradeB
TradeA
Eacar
Dg
Pbrank
Prior_
Size
YeardTradeBFðTradeBANÞ ¼ a0þ a1Eacar þ a2Pbrank þ a3Prior ret þ a4Sizeþ a5Yeardum þ e ð1Þ
TradeAF ¼ b0þ b1Eacar þ b2Pbrank þ b3Prior ret þ b4Sizeþ b5Yeardum þ e ð2ÞModel 1 examines the active trading activities during the trading ban period, PBAN, and before the trading
ban period, PBF. In active trading, when forthcoming earnings news is positive (negative), insiders are likely to
buy (sell) in advance, so insiders’ net buying and the forthcoming earnings news should be positively related
and the coeﬃcient of Eacar, a1, is expected to be positive. Model 2 examines passive trading after the ban per-
iod, PAF. In passive trading, when announced earnings news is positive (negative), the stock price increases
(decreases) and insiders are likely to sell (buy), so insiders’ net buying and announced earnings news should
be negatively related and the coeﬃcient of Eacar, b1, is expected to be negative. Following Huddart et al.
(2007), we control for P/B, previous buy-and-hold returns and company size.
Because diﬀerent companies remove the lockup restriction at diﬀerent times, some of the largest share-
holders were still in lockup and could not trade during the sample period (April 2008 to September 2011).
This resulted in many observations with no trading activities (dependent variable equals 0). Including the
observations with no trading either because shareholders did not want to trade or because they were in lockup,
the sample comprises 18,300 ﬁrm-quarter observations. We call this the large sample. If we include only
ﬁrm-quarter observations with trading activities, then the sample sizes within 1 month before and 10 days after
the ban period are 170, 290 and 125, respectively, with a total of 585 ﬁrm-quarter observations. This sample is
called the small sample, as it is only 3.2% of the large sample. We test the models using both samples and the
results are consistent. The direction and the magnitude of the independent variables’ coeﬃcients are similar,
but the diﬀerence is that the adjusted R2 of the large sample test is much lower than that of the small sample
test. This is mainly due to the large number of observations with no trading activities in the large sample. The
results reported in this study are mainly based on the small sample regression tests (see Table 8).4.3. Empirical results
Table 9 shows the variables’ descriptive statistics. The means suggest that net selling is evident for all three
windows, and that the magnitude of TradeBAN is smaller than that of TradeBF and TradeAF. The mean and
median of Prior_ret are both positive, and combined with the net selling evidence, the results suggest that large
shareholders tend to sell after price increases, which is consistent with contrarian trading. The mean of Dg8
le deﬁnitions.
le Deﬁnition
F The net buying of the largest shareholders in company i in period PBF, which is the buying percentage minus the selling
percentage of stock ownership
AN The net buying of the largest shareholders in company i in period PBAN, which is the buying percentage minus the selling
percentage of stock ownership
F The net buying of the largest shareholders in company i in period PAF, which is the buying percentage minus the selling
percentage of stock ownership
Cumulative abnormal returns one day before and one day after the disclosure date of the ﬁnancial report [1, 1]; positive
(negative) value of CAR means unexpected good (bad) earnings news. The calculation of excess returns is based on the
standard market model
1 if the largest shareholder is state-owned; else 0
All of the companies listed on the main board are ranked into ﬁve groups based on P/B at the end of each quarter
ret Buy and hold returns for the six months before the beginning date of corresponding PBF, PBAN, PAF
Company size, calculated as the natural log of the market value of the listed company
um Dummy variables for years
Table 9
Descriptive statistics of ﬁrm-quarter observations.
N Mean Median Std. p5 p95
TradeBAN 170 0.006 0.002 0.016 0.048 0.010
TradeBF 290 0.011 0.009 0.020 0.050 0.010
TradeAF 125 0.012 0.010 0.016 0.044 0.008
Eacar 500 0.004 0.007 0.043 0.072 0.067
Pbrank 506 2.567 2.000 1.328 1 5
Prior_ret_Ban 505 0.136 0.143 0.447 0.670 0.872
Prior_ret_BF 505 0.091 0.161 0.479 0.740 0.838
Prior_ret_AF 505 0.114 0.170 0.510 0.845 0.913
Size 506 15.402 15.175 1.239 13.962 17.836
Dg 506 0.636 1.000 0.482 0 1
Table 10
Active insider trading within the trading ban period.
Dependent variable: TradeBAN Full sample Private company State-owned company Full sample
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.036 2.51** 0.010 0.33 0.044 2.92*** 0.037 2.53**
Eacar 0.025 0.97 0.043 0.90 0.014 0.42 0.043 0.96
Dg 0.002 0.66
Eacar*Dg 0.030 0.50
Pbrank 0.000 0.17 0.001 0.27 0.000 0.16 0.000 0.03
Prior_ret 0.002 0.58 0.003 0.37 0.003 0.82 0.002 0.56
Size 0.003 2.94*** 0.000 0.22 0.003 3.12*** 0.002 2.92***
Y2009 0.012 3.88*** 0.019 3.55*** 0.010 2.65*** 0.012 3.80***
Y2010 0.011 3.38*** 0.015 2.07** 0.011 2.93*** 0.012 3.39***
Y2011 0.021 2.89*** 0.033 3.20*** 0.005 1.45 0.020 2.85***
R2 0.138 4.77*** 0.161 2.48** 0.103 2.8*** 0.132 3.78***
N 166 55 111 166
Dependent variable: TradeBAN Quarterly ﬁnancial report Annual (semi-annual)
ﬁnancial report
Full sample
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.026 1.57 0.065 1.89* 0.036 2.63***
Eacar 0.043 1.38 0.023 0.53 0.036 1.16
Annual-dummy 0.005 1.82*
Eacar* Annual-dummy 0.039 0.70
Pbrank 0.001 0.49 0.001 0.82 0.000 0.03
Prior_ret 0.001 0.22 0.014 2.19** 0.002 0.46
Size 0.002 2.05** 0.004 2.00* 0.002 3.00***
Y2009 0.014 4.02*** 0.008 1.35 0.013 4.17***
Y2010 0.017 3.58*** 0.004 0.64 0.012 3.83***
Y2011 0.025 3.23*** 0.012 0.85 0.021 3.00***
R2 0.204 4.95*** 0.085 1.74* 0.15 4.23***
N 109 57 166
Note: TradeBAN is the largest shareholder’s net buying of company i’s stock within the ban period PBAN. Dg is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the largest shareholder is state-owned; else 0. Annual-dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁnancial report is annual
or semi-annual; else 0. t-values are white-adjusted (White, 1980).
* Denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%.
** Denote signiﬁcance levels at 5%.
*** Denote signiﬁcance levels at 1%.
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companies.
Table 10 shows the active insider trading within the ban period, PBAN. The coeﬃcient of Eacar is positive
but not signiﬁcant, so there is no signiﬁcant association between shareholders’ net buying and the upcoming
Table 11
Active insider trading one month before the trading ban period.
Dependent variable: TradeBF Full sample Private company State-owned company Full sample
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.033 2.87*** 0.028 0.82 0.043 3.69*** 0.031 2.68***
Eacar 0.056 2.45** 0.099 2.67*** 0.008 0.31 0.099 2.68***
Dg 0.007 2.84***
Eacar*Dg 0.084 1.78*
Pbrank 0.002 2.00** 0.004 2.26** 0.000 0.45 0.002 1.72*
Prior_ret 0.005 1.27 0.001 0.11 0.004 0.91 0.003 0.88
Size 0.002 3.19*** 0.002 0.93 0.003 3.99*** 0.002 2.45**
Y2009 0.004 1.03 0.007 0.98 0.004 0.85 0.005 1.17
Y2010 0.005 1.51 0.004 0.74 0.012 2.72*** 0.006 1.58
Y2011 0.008 1.18 0.019 2.11** 0.003 0.47 0.008 1.28
R2 0.112 6.15*** 0.148 3.65*** 0.11 4.13*** 0.148 6.48***
N 287 108 179 287
Dependent variable: TradeBF Private company and quarterly
ﬁnancial report
Private company and annual
(semi-annual) ﬁnancial report
State-owned company and
quarterly ﬁnancial report
State-owned company and annual
(semi-annual) ﬁnancial report
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.144 1.99* 0.004 0.11 0.018 1.79* 0.072 2.61**
Eacar 0.148 1.07 0.114 3.11*** 0.001 0.07 0.035 0.64
Pbrank 0.005 0.83 0.003 1.79* 0.001 1.01 0.002 1.33
Prior_ret 0.014 0.96 0.008 1.17 0.003 0.62 0.004 0.60
Size 0.010 2.02 0.000 0.13 0.001 2.64*** 0.004 2.45**
Y2009 0.005 0.30 0.004 0.68 0.004 0.58 0.006 0.88
Y2010 0.008 0.51 0.007 1.07 0.015 2.90*** 0.009 1.17
Y2011 0.001 0.03 0.019 2.16** 0.014 2.88*** 0.001 0.07
R2 0.277 2.64*** 0.117 2.43** 0.362 8.13*** 0.027 0.67
N 31 77 90 89
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closure date of the ﬁnancial report, their concern about high market attention and regulation risk prompted
them to avoid the risk involved in using the upcoming earnings information. Thus, the trading ban regulation
seems to have a deterrent eﬀect. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, active trading is not obvious during the ban
period. Large shareholders seem to avoid insider trading within the sensitive ban period given the associated
regulation risk.
The same results can be observed after the sample is divided into state-owned and private companies. When
the sample is divided into quarterly and annual earnings, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of Eacar within the quar-
terly ban period is almost signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcient of Eacar within the annual ban period is not. The
results suggest that insider trading within the quarterly ban period is more evident than that within the annual
ban period. The diﬀerence in regulation risk between the two types of ﬁnancial reports probably inﬂuenced the
insiders’ trading choices.
Table 11 reports the results of active insider trading one month before the ban period. The result of the full
sample shows that the coeﬃcient of Eacar is 0.056, signiﬁcant at the 5% level, indicating that insiders use
upcoming earnings information to engage in active trading. The results of the state-owned and
private-company samples suggest that active insider trading is evident among the large shareholders of private
companies, but not among the large shareholders of state-owned companies. The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the
interaction term Eacar*Dg suggests that the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. When the sample is divided into quarterly
and annual (semi-annual) earnings reports, the results suggest that the large shareholders of private companies
actively traded before the ban period of the annual, but not of the quarterly, ﬁnancial report. The information
content of annual earnings is higher than that of quarterly earnings; however, using annual earnings informa-
tion to trade beforehand generates a higher regulation risk than using quarterly earnings information. The
choice made by the large shareholders of private companies to actively trade before the ban period of an
annual ﬁnancial report is related to their risk preference and stronger proﬁt-seeking incentive.
The above ﬁndings support Hypotheses 2 and 3. In China, moving trading before the ban period is an
important strategy for insiders to deal with the ban regulation. Although this does not appear to violate
the ban period regulation, active trading before the ban period has in fact used earnings information.
Because the large shareholders of private companies have more information advantages, a higher risk prefer-
ence and stronger proﬁt-seeking incentives, their active trading before the ban period is more evident.
Table 12 reports the results of passive insider trading 10 days after the announcement of a ﬁnancial report.
The results of the full sample show that the coeﬃcient of Eacar is 0.013, but it is not signiﬁcant, which suggests
that passive insider trading is not evident. The results of the state-owned and private company sub-samples
suggest that passive trading is signiﬁcant for the large shareholders of the former, and not the latter. The coef-
ﬁcient of the interaction term Eacar*Dg conﬁrms that the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. When the sam-
ple is divided into quarterly and annual ﬁnancial reports, we ﬁnd that large shareholders of state-owned
companies passively traded after quarterly ﬁnancial reports, but not after annual ﬁnancial reports. Trading
around quarterly ﬁnancial reports is subject to lower regulation risk and market attention than around annual
reports. Thus, even with passive trading, the large shareholders of state-owned companies chose to trade
around quarterly announcements with lower regulation risk.
In summary, under the trading ban regulation, the large shareholders of private companies mainly choose
to actively trade before the ban period, whereas those of state-owned companies choose to passively trade
after the ban period. In addition, the large shareholders of private companies prefer to use annual
(semi-annual) earnings information with higher information content while those of state-owned companies
prefer to use quarterly earnings information with lower regulation risk. It is possible that the diﬀerences in
information advantages, proﬁt-seeking incentives and risk preferences between the two types of large share-
holders have driven the results.
5. Empirical tests II: The deterrence eﬀects of the trading ban regulation on insider trading proﬁtability
The trading ban regulation’s intention is to prohibit insider trading when insiders have superior informa-
tion advantages, to protect the interests of external investors. Its main purpose is to limit insiders’ trading
proﬁts around the announcement of a ﬁnancial report.
Table 12
Passive trading 10 days after the ban period.
Dependent variable: TradeAF Full sample Private company State-owned company Full sample
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.051 2.60** 0.032 0.83 0.043 2.34** 0.049 2.40**
Eacar 0.013 0.46 0.042 1.31 0.035 2.52** 0.054 1.28
Dg 0.005 1.97*
Eacar*Dg 0.093 1.80*
Pbrank 0.002 2.00** 0.000 0.15 0.003 3.01*** 0.002 2.05**
Prior_ret 0.008 2.42** 0.014 3.08*** 0.001 0.25 0.007 2.37**
Size 0.003 2.67*** 0.002 0.66 0.003 2.68*** 0.003 2.35**
Y2009 0.007 2.09** 0.011 2.09** 0.007 2.57** 0.008 2.39**
Y2010 0.009 2.44** 0.003 0.62 0.015 3.93*** 0.010 2.63***
Y2011 0.010 1.48 0.013 1.05 0.006 1.88* 0.009 1.37
R2 0.243 6.64*** 0.292 4.06*** 0.392 7.45*** 0.267 5.98***
N 124 53 71 124
Dependent variable: TradeAF Private company and quarterly
ﬁnancial report
Private company and annual
(semi-annual) ﬁnancial report
State-owned company and
quarterly ﬁnancial report
State-owned company and annual
(semi-annual) ﬁnancial report
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.041 0.84 0.008 0.15 0.056 2.19** 0.039 2.13**
Eacar 0.003 0.08 0.098 1.61 0.066 2.11** 0.015 0.53
Pbrank 0.002 0.87 0.001 0.23 0.003 2.05** 0.002 2.21**
Prior_ret 0.016 1.49 0.021 2.59** 0.006 1.35 0.005 2.05**
Size 0.004 1.22 0.000 0.08 0.004 2.66*** 0.003 2.30**
Y2009 0.042 3.16*** 0.012 1.80* 0.016 2.95*** 0.001 0.66
Y2010 0.031 1.90* 0.004 0.46 0.018 2.54** 0.020 3.74***
Y2011 0.041 2.55** 0.003 0.15 0.016 2.72*** 0.001 0.27
R2 0.27 2.48** 0.209 1.87* 0.379 4.48*** 0.532 5.72***
N 29 24 41 30
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C. Zhu, L. Wang /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 169–191 1855.1. The eﬀects of the trading ban regulation on overall trading proﬁtability
In this study, we examine the deterrent eﬀect of the trading ban regulation from an insider trading prof-
itability perspective. We use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to calculate cumulative abnormal
returns (TCAR) for three or six months after the trade. TCAR represents trading proﬁt from every trade. We
then compare the mean diﬀerence of TCAR in PBF, PBAN and PAF. For buying, TCAR represents abnormal
returns gained since the trade and for selling, the loss avoided since the trade. Thus, we multiply TCAR by
(1) to make the TCAR of the sale positive. We calculate TCAR for both three months (TCAR90) and
six months (TCAR180). TCAR90 measures the short-term trading proﬁt when insiders use recent earnings
information to trade, so TCAR90 can better capture insider trading proﬁt. The empirical results of
TCAR90 and TCAR180 are similar, so we mainly report the results of TCAR90 in this study.
To examine the trading ban regulation’s eﬀects on trading proﬁtability, we include data before the regula-
tion in Table 13. Before the regulation, the mean insider trading proﬁtability one month before earnings
announcements (the ban period) was 7.4%. This is similar to the results of one month before the ban period.
The results suggest that large shareholders’ insider trading before earnings announcements is evident.
After the regulation, the trading proﬁtability, mean or median, during the ban period PBAN is evidently
lower than in the other two periods. The mean of TCAR90 in PBAN is only 2.2% while before and after
the ban period it is 8.6% and 10.0%, respectively. The results suggest that the ban regulation’s deterrent eﬀect
is apparent. The results are also consistent with the ﬁndings reported in previous tables, which suggest that,
after the regulation, insider trading during the ban period decreased, but there was stealth insider trading
before or after the ban period.Table
Compa
Pre-reg
PBF
PBAN
PAF
Post-re
PBF
PBAN
PAF
Note:
month
respectEmpirical Model :
TCAR ¼ a0þ a1DPBF þ a2DPAF þ a3Tradeszþ a4Bfret þ a5Pbrank
þa6Sizeþ a7Yeardumþ eNext, we use the empirical model speciﬁed above to further examine the trading ban regulation’s eﬀect on the
largest shareholders’ trading proﬁtability. In this model, we include two dummy variables, DPBF and DPAF.
When trading happened one month before the ban period, DPBF = 1; else, DPBF = 0. When trading happened
10 days after the ban period, DPAF = 1; else, DPAF = 0. The base group’s trading occurred during the ban
period, PBAN.
Tradesz is the size of the trade, measured by percentage of ownership.
Bfret is the cumulative abnormal return one month before the trade. The calculation of Bfret is similar to
that of TCAR. For selling activities, Bfret is cumulative abnormal returns times (1).
Pbrank is the rank of the P/B ratio. All of the main board companies are ranked in ﬁve groups based on
each quarter-end P/B ratio.13
rison of large shareholders’ trading proﬁts.
TCAR90 TCAR180
N Mean Median Mean Median
ulation
98 0.091 0.106 0.099 0.087
101 0.074 0.089 0.097 0.118
42 0.129 0.142 0.182 0.220
gulation
389 0.086 0.077 0.124 0.095
213 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.015
168 0.100 0.087 0.179 0.183
TCAR90 (TCAR180) is the cumulative abnormal returns three months (six months) after the trade; PBF, PBAN and PAF are one
before, one month of and 10 days after the trading ban period (which is one month before the earnings announcement),
ively.
Table 14
Descriptive statistics based on transactions.
N Mean Median P5 P95 Std.
TCAR90 770 0.071 0.066 0.243 0.384 0.196
TCAR180 770 0.111 0.088 0.335 0.588 0.300
Tradesz 770 0.010 0.007 0.000 0.037 0.011
Bfret 770 0.005 0.005 0.207 0.204 0.123
Pbrank 770 2.643 3.000 1.000 5.000 1.376
Size 770 15.307 15.124 13.854 17.425 1.158
Dg 770 0.584 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.493
Control 770 0.668 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.471
Annual–dummy 770 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500
Note: Control is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the shareholders’ ownership is more than 30%, else 0.
Table 15
Eﬀects of the trading ban regulation on large shareholders’ trading proﬁtability.
Dependent variable: TCAR90 Full sample Quarterly ﬁnancial report Annual (semi-annual)
ﬁnancial report
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.190 2.07** 0.143 1.44 0.261 1.40
DPBF 0.046 2.83
*** 0.035 1.60 0.050 1.84*
DPAF 0.064 3.27
*** 0.082 3.48*** 0.040 1.20
Tradesz 2.342 3.44*** 1.556 1.46 2.961 3.44***
Bfret 0.089 1.40 0.047 0.54 0.168 1.66*
Pbrank 0.036 6.27*** 0.044 5.82*** 0.031 3.60***
Size 0.009 1.53 0.004 0.69 0.016 1.34
Y2009 0.034 1.68* 0.005 0.19 0.083 2.70***
Y2010 0.042 1.95* 0.050 1.69* 0.056 1.65*
Y2011 0.070 2.43** 0.113 3.28*** 0.060 1.37
R2 0.091 9.55*** 0.13 7.64*** 0.073 4.20***
N 770 402 368
Dependent variable: TCAR90 Private company State-owned company Stock ownership <30% Stock ownershipP30%
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.373 2.07** 0.175 1.66* 0.468 2.15** 0.082 0.80
DPBF 0.092 3.33
*** 0.023 1.13 0.035 1.38 0.046 2.32**
DPAF 0.080 2.58
** 0.054 2.04** 0.011 0.33 0.073 3.03***
Tradesz 1.517 1.64 2.938 2.80*** 1.743 1.53 2.361 2.81***
Bfret 0.021 0.22 0.148 1.71* 0.125 1.24 0.059 0.73
Pbrank 0.042 4.64*** 0.029 3.90*** 0.054 5.54*** 0.022 3.20***
Size 0.023 1.86* 0.007 1.14 0.031 2.07** 0.002 0.31
Y2009 0.105 3.59*** 0.007 0.28 0.128 3.54*** 0.003 0.13
Y2010 0.129 3.54*** 0.001 0.04 0.181 5.30*** 0.037 1.37
Y2011 0.062 1.45 0.093 2.77*** 0.147 2.49** 0.042 1.31
R2 0.115 5.61*** 0.086 5.70*** 0.192 7.75*** 0.078 5.83***
N 320 450 256 514
186 C. Zhu, L. Wang /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 169–191Based on individual transactions, the average large shareholder trading proﬁtability three (six) months after
the trade is 7.1% (11.1%) and the average trading ownership for each transaction is 1%. A total of 66.8% of the
trades is from shareholders with more than 30% ownership and 58.4% (41.6%) of the trades are from the large
shareholders of state-owned (private) companies. The number of trades around annual ﬁnancial reports is
similar to that around quarterly ﬁnancial reports (see Table 14).
As shown in Table 15, the coeﬃcient of DPBF is 0.046 and the coeﬃcient of DPAF is 0.064, both signiﬁcant
at 1%, suggesting that trading during the ban period is signiﬁcantly lower than that before or after the ban
period. These results reﬂect the deterrent eﬀect of the trading ban regulation. During the trading ban period
C. Zhu, L. Wang /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 169–191 187(or the sensitive period), even if some large shareholders are allowed to trade, they choose trades with low
information content and for liquidity to avoid regulation risk and criticism from investors. The deterrent eﬀect
is apparent, but the large shareholders do not give up. Through moving the trades back or forward, they
continue to use earnings information; thus, trading proﬁt around the ban period remains quite high.
When diﬀerentiating between the types of ﬁnancial reports, we ﬁnd that the deterrent eﬀect exists for both
the quarterly and the annual (semi-annual) ﬁnancial reports, with a slight diﬀerence. Trading proﬁtability after
the ban period is signiﬁcantly higher for quarterly earnings while that before the ban period is signiﬁcantly
higher for annual earnings. This is consistent with the evidence reported above, that the large shareholders
of private companies prefer to trade before the ban period of annual ﬁnancial reports while those of
state-owned companies prefer to trade after the ban period of quarterly ﬁnancial reports.
We also ﬁnd that the deterrent eﬀect exists for insider trades by large shareholders of both state-owned and
private companies. Large shareholders of state-owned companies do not obtain signiﬁcantly more trading
proﬁt before the ban period than during it, suggesting that these shareholders generally do not move trading
to before the ban period. In addition, we ﬁnd that the deterrent eﬀect is more evident in trading by sharehold-
ers with greater than 30% ownership than it is in trading by those with less than 30% ownership. Shareholders
with higher ownership are among the insiders targeted by the ban regulation. Shareholders with less than 30%
ownership obtain lower trading proﬁts during than around the ban period, but the diﬀerences are not
signiﬁcant so the regulation has a limited eﬀect on them.
5.2. Trading proﬁtability of informed trades under the ban regulation
Do all trades conducted before the announcement of a ﬁnancial report exploit earnings information? The
answer is No. Following Hillier and Marshall (2002), we divide the trades before the announcement of a ﬁnan-
cial report into informed and uninformed trades. Buying before good and selling before bad earnings news are
considered to be informed trades while other trades are considered to be uninformed. Informed trades are sys-
tematically associated with earnings information and thus strongly indicate insider trading. In contrast, unin-
formed trades are not, so they can be considered as normal trading. By comparing trading proﬁtability
between informed and uninformed trades, we quantify the abnormal returns earned by exploiting inside infor-
mation and more clearly assess the deterrent eﬀect of the ban regulation from a trading proﬁt perspective.
We only focus on informed and uninformed trades before the announcement of a ﬁnancial report. This
focus is because: insider trading before an earnings news announcement is the main concern of regulators
and investors; informed trades after an earnings news announcement (e.g. selling after exceptionally good
news) are diﬃcult to separate from normal selling for liquidity (Garﬁnkel, 1997); and Kolasinski and Li
(2010) suggest that uninformed trades after an earnings news announcement (buying after good earnings
news) could trade on the market’s incomplete response to the news and earn abnormal returns as well.
As Table 16 shows, during PBF, the average TCAR90 earned from informed trades is 11.9% while that from
uninformed trades is only 4.2%. The trading proﬁtability of informed trades is 2.83 times that of uninformed
trades. In addition, the frequency and the size of informed trades are much higher than those of uninformed
trades. The evidence further conﬁrms that large shareholders in China move insider trading to before the trad-
ing ban period. During PBAN, the average TCAR90 gained from informed trades is 7.5%, whereas that gained
from uninformed trades is 2.4%. The trading proﬁt of informed trades is still higher than that of uninformed
trades; however, both types of trading proﬁtability are lower than that during the PBF period.
In summary, during the trading ban period, the trading proﬁts of both informed and uninformed trades are
suppressed. However, before the ban period, large shareholders obtain considerable abnormal returns through
informed trades.
As indicated by Dg in Table 17, the average trading proﬁtability (TCAR90) of informed trades by large
shareholders in private companies before (during) the ban period is 14.3% (11.6%). In comparison, the trading
proﬁtability of informed trades by large shareholders in state-owned companies before (during) the ban period
is 9.4% (5.3%). The large shareholders of private companies earn higher proﬁts through informed trades, and
the proportion of their informed trades is also higher.
We further divide large shareholders based on their level of ownership and ﬁnd that those with less than
30% ownership (Control = 0) earn lower proﬁts than their counterparts with more than 30% ownership
Table 16
Comparison of trading proﬁtability between informed and uninformed trades.
TCAR90 TCAR180 Tradesz
N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
PBF
Informed trade = 0 172 0.042 0.044 0.056 0.045 0.009 0.007
Informed trade = 1 215 0.119 0.106 0.178 0.154 0.012 0.009
PBAN
Informed trade = 0 102 0.024 0.016 0.031 0.044 0.007 0.003
Informed trade = 1 106 0.075 0.062 0.103 0.054 0.009 0.004
Note: PBF and PBAN are one month before and one month during the ban period, respectively. Tradesz is the size of the trade, measured by
percentage of ownership. TCAR90 (TCAR180) is cumulative abnormal returns three (six) months after the trade.
Table 17
Comparison of Trading Proﬁtability between Informed and Uninformed Trades – Further Analysis.
TCAR90 TCAR90
N Mean Median N Mean Median
PBF PBAN
Annual report = 0 Informed trade = 0 70 0.012 0.003 Annual report = 0 Informed trade = 0 68 0.033 0.043
Informed trade = 1 84 0.129 0.103 Informed trade = 1 79 0.076 0.057
Annual report = 1 Informed trade = 0 102 0.063 0.064 Annual report = 1 Informed trade = 0 34 0.008 0.006
Informed trade = 1 131 0.113 0.107 Informed trade = 1 27 0.071 0.069
PBF PBAN
Dg = 0 Informed trade = 0 59 0.077 0.067 Dg = 0 Informed trade = 0 32 0.071 0.012
Informed trade = 1 112 0.143 0.127 Informed trade = 1 37 0.116 0.079
Dg = 1 Informed trade = 0 113 0.024 0.014 Dg = 1 Informed trade = 0 70 0.003 0.019
Informed trade = 1 103 0.094 0.086 Informed trade = 1 69 0.053 0.047
PBF PBAN
Control = 0 Informed trade = 0 61 0.021 0.022 Control = 0 Informed trade = 0 41 0.044 0.068
Informed trade = 1 77 0.132 0.104 Informed trade = 1 32 0.109 0.072
Control = 1 Informed trade = 0 111 0.054 0.067 Control = 1 Informed trade = 0 61 0.011 0.012
Informed trade = 1 138 0.112 0.108 Informed trade = 1 74 0.060 0.058
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ban period, shareholders with less than 30% ownership earn, on average, 10.9% (13.2%) of abnormal returns
through informed trades—much higher than the 6.0% (11.2%) earned through informed trades by sharehold-
ers with more than 30% ownership.
Table 18 examines the excess proﬁtability of informed over uninformed trades. The coeﬃcient of the
Informed-Dummy variable is 0.072 and signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that large shareholders earn 7.2%
higher abnormal returns than uninformed trades by exploiting inside earnings information. In addition, we
ﬁnd that the excess proﬁtability obtained through informed trades before quarterly ﬁnancial reports is higher
than that obtained before annual ﬁnancial reports. The large shareholders of private companies earn an addi-
tional 11.2% abnormal returns through informed trades—higher than the additional 5.3% abnormal returns
earned by the shareholders of state-owned companies. We also ﬁnd that shareholders with less than 30% own-
ership obtain an additional 11.6% abnormal returns—much higher than the 4.6% obtained by shareholders
with more than 30% ownership.
In summary, even under the trading ban regulation, large shareholders can change their trading behavior
and earn economically signiﬁcant abnormal returns by exploiting earnings information. The high proﬁtability
through insider trading is especially evident among large shareholders of private companies and shareholders
with less than 30% ownership.
Table 18
Excess proﬁtability of informed over uninformed trades.
Dependent variable Full sample Quarterly ﬁnancial report Annual (semi-annual)
ﬁnancial report
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
TCAR90
Intercept 0.133 1.37 0.028 0.28 0.320 1.50
Informed–Dummy 0.072 4.94*** 0.082 3.95*** 0.057 2.62***
Tradesz 2.105 2.73*** 1.411 1.09 2.355 2.62***
Bfret 0.064 0.86 0.012 0.12 0.182 1.62
Pbrank 0.032 5.00*** 0.034 3.86*** 0.032 3.31***
Size 0.005 0.87 0.003 0.55 0.021 1.59
Y2009 0.027 1.18 0.011 0.34 0.091 2.58**
Y2010 0.036 1.44 0.029 0.82 0.085 2.15**
Y2011 0.087 2.65*** 0.111 2.48** 0.111 2.42**
R2 0.106 9.79*** 0.147 7.45*** 0.081 4.22***
N 595 301 294
Dependent variable Private company State-owned company Ownership <30% Ownership P30%
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
TCAR90
Intercept 0.399 2.03* 0.085 0.77 0.550 2.32** 0.009 0.08
Informed–Dummy 0.112 4.74*** 0.053 2.80*** 0.116 4.79*** 0.046 2.51**
Tradesz 1.471 1.46 2.584 2.29*** 0.852 0.71 2.697 2.66***
Bfret 0.059 0.58 0.187 1.82* 0.101 0.89 0.033 0.34
Pbrank 0.050 5.14*** 0.018 1.98** 0.054 5.10*** 0.016 2.03**
Size 0.024 1.82* 0.002 0.34 0.034 2.11** 0.003 0.43
Y2009 0.117 3.38*** 0.014 0.50 0.116 2.71*** 0.010 0.33
Y2010 0.154 3.69*** 0.020 0.64 0.165 3.98*** 0.049 1.56
Y2011 0.149 3.06*** 0.060 1.51 0.131 1.93* 0.073 2.13**
R2 0.193 8.12*** 0.067 4.19*** 0.255 9.97*** 0.081 5.20***
N 240 355 211 384
Note: We combine trades in PBF and PBAN for the tests shown in this table. Informed-Dummy is a dummy variable, 1 if it is an informed
trade; else, 0.
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How to improve the eﬀectiveness of insider trading regulations is not only an important academic topic, but
also a regulatory challenge that must be addressed. A trading ban is an important regulatory tool used by
many countries to curtail insider trading; however, it has generated limited research. This study focuses on
insider trading conducted by the largest shareholders and investigates insider trading patterns under the
ban regulation, providing a comprehensive examination of the eﬀectiveness of the ban regulation.
The results suggest that due to regulation risk, insider trading during the trading ban period is limited.
However, large shareholders continue to exploit earnings information either by moving the trading before
the ban period (private companies) or after the ban period (state-owned companies). In addition, large share-
holders of private companies prefer to use annual (semi-annual) earnings information, whereas those of
state-owned companies prefer to trade after the announcement of the less risky quarterly ﬁnancial report.
The diﬀerences in the shareholders’ trading patterns are related to the diﬀerences in their information
advantages, proﬁt-seeking incentives and risk preferences.
Regarding the regulation’s eﬀectiveness, trading proﬁtability is signiﬁcantly lower during the ban period
than before or after it, suggesting that the ban regulation has a deterrent eﬀect. However, the results also sug-
gest that trading proﬁtability before or after the ban period is signiﬁcantly higher. We further divide trades
into those that are informed and those that are uninformed to better quantify the excess returns earned by
exploiting inside earnings information. We ﬁnd that the informed trading proﬁt is 2.83 times the uninformed
190 C. Zhu, L. Wang /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 169–191trading proﬁt, particularly for large shareholders in private companies and shareholders with less than 30%
ownership.
In summary, our study ﬁnds that the trading ban regulation is eﬀective in curbing insider trading during the
ban period. However, large shareholders can move trading to before or after the ban period to continue earn-
ing substantial abnormal returns. The regulation does not fundamentally increase the cost of insider trading
by large shareholders. The regulation is especially not eﬀective for large shareholders in private companies and
shareholders with less than 30% ownership.
The compromise of the regulation’s eﬀectiveness is related to the overall regulatory environment in China.
Currently, the regulation on insider trading emphasizes rigid administrative regulations without using more
ﬂexible civil litigation and market monitoring. If investors, attorneys and the media are given the right to ques-
tion and bring litigation against insider trading, the threshold of bringing litigation is lowered and the process
of litigation is streamlined so that insiders can restrain informed trading around the ban period in the presence
of higher litigation risk. To improve the eﬀectiveness of insider trading regulations, a stringent administrative
monitoring system must be integrated with a market monitoring system.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it systematically examines the insider trading
behavior of large shareholders and explores how ownership nature aﬀects large shareholders’ trading behav-
ior, adding to our current understanding of the latter. Second, this study contributes to the research on the
relationship between regulation and insider trading. The literature on mandatory trading ban regulation is
very limited and herein we systematically investigate how a new, mandatory trading ban regulation aﬀects
large shareholder trading behavior in the emerging market of China. We ﬁnd that several factors signiﬁcantly
aﬀect how large shareholders deal with the new regulation, such as annual or quarterly earnings reports with
diﬀerent regulation risks, state or private ownership and high or low ownership. Third, the literature, based
largely on studies of the United States’ markets, consistently documents that insider trading regulation can
eﬀectively reduce insider trading before earnings announcements and insiders are forced to choose passive
trading. However, we ﬁnd that in China, under the less mature legal environment, the eﬀectiveness of the
speciﬁc ban regulation tool is very limited. Insiders simply move trading ahead to avoid the bright line ban
period. The ﬁndings suggest that a more mature legal system is probably more important than speciﬁc tools,
and the overall legal environment can either enhance or reduce the eﬀectiveness of speciﬁc regulation tools.
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